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ABSTRACT
Mobile Ad hoc Network or MANET is a wireless network that allows communication between the nodes that are
in range of each other and are self-configuring. The distributed administration and dynamic nature of MANET
makes it vulnerable to many kind of security attacks. One such attack is Black hole attack which is a well known
security threat. A node drops all packets which it should forward, by claiming that it has the shortest path to
the destination. Intrusion Detection system identifies the unauthorized users in the system. An IDS collects and
analyses audit data to detect unauthorized users of computer systems. This paper aims in identifying Black-Hole
attack against AODV with Intrusion Detection System, to analyze the attack and find its countermeasure.
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1. INTRODUCTION
MANET coordinate on their own where they are not connected to any wireless routers. Here the nodes can join
and leave the network dynamically. The nodes of MANET do not have a centralized administration mechanism.
Each node acts as a “router” to forward the data packets to other nodes in the network. MANET have limited
energy and computing resources. Bandwidth decreases with asymptotically with hop count. Various routing goals
are finding end to end paths, scaling, loop free, route maintenance. Control message consists of sequence numbers
to avoid routing loops. The characteristics of MANET include dynamic topology, decentralized architecture and
open medium which make it susceptible to various kinds of attacks. Various kinds of attacks in MANET include
Sybil attack, snooping attack, black hole attack, rushing attack. MANET involves various challenges.1 Lack of
centralized management will impede trust management for nodes. Due to mobility of nodes, topology of ad-hoc
network changes all the time. So scalability is a major issue regarding security. Security mechanism ought to be
capable of handling bigger network as well as smaller ones. Now let’s discuss about the black hole attack that
occurs in MANET2 and the contribution of IDS on improving the efficiency of the network.
In3 prevention of Black Hole Problem in an efficient manner in AODV Routing Protocol is proposed. The
malicious node In Black-hole attack falsely advertises the path to the destination node as the shortest path
with the motive of disrupting proper communication. The proposed method is to detect the black hole node by
using promiscuous node and the information is propagated throughout the network. In4 a method is proposed
which is advancement in AODV to avoid black hole attack in MANET. In,5 proposes a trust based approach
which improves the performance and scalability of MANETs. The cluster in this context refers to node groups
where nodes are connected tightly based on trust relationship. The cooperation between any two nodes helps
to calculate trust value. Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the system or the network for some
malicious activities, which threatens security of the system and violates computer security policies. Intrusion
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Figure 1. Black- Hole attack.
detection systems (IDS) can be classified into many ways. The major classifications are Active and passive IDS,
Network Intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host Intrusion detection systems (HIDS). An active Intrusion
Detection Systems6 is also known as (IDPS) Intrusion Detection and Prevention System. IDPS is configured to
block suspected attacks without any intervention required by an operator. A passive Intrusion detection System
is a technique that’s configured to only monitor and analyze network traffic activity and alert an operator to
potential vulnerabilities. A passive IDS is not capable of performing any protective functions on its own. NIDS
examines all the traffic on the system. An effective ID should also perform protocol analysis and further detect
protocols such as TCP, ICMP, UDP, FTP, SMTP, HTTP, DNS, SNMP, and Telnet. More advanced NIDS can
actually display these protocol transactions in real time. HIDS monitors traffic on the specific systems only.
In this case, the sensor of the Intrusion Detection System is located inside of the particular host to monitor
system-level behavior. Depending on the detection techniques used, IDS can be categorized into three main
categories:
Figure 2. RREQ from S to A.
1.1 Signature-based (Misuse detection model)
It compares notable threat signatures to determined events for characterising intrusion. This is a very effective
for detecting glaring notable threats but is not effective in detecting unknown threats and variations of the
earlier. Signature-based detection cannot track and perceive the state of advanced communications. Hence this
model cannot detect multiple events.
1.2 Anomaly-based detection
It compares normal activity against the activity which is considered malicious. This is done by characteristic
monitoring for a period of time. This IDPS compares the present activity characteristics to thresholds related to
the profile. Anomaly-based detection technique may generate many false positives as a slight deviation in user
activity may cause an alarm but useful in detecting previously unknown threats.
Figure 3. Broadcast of RREQ.
1.3 Specification-based detection
It defines a group of constraints that explains the proper operation of a protocol. It checks the execution of the
program with respect to outlined constraints. This method has the capability of detecting previously unknown
attacks with low false positive rate.
1.4 Characteristics of IDS
The characteristic of IDS includes detection method, behaviour on the detection, audit source location, detection
paradigm.
• Detection Method: The characteristics of the analyzer.
• Behaviour on the detection: The response of the IDS to attacks.
• Audit source Location: Kind of input information that IDS analyses.
• Detection Paradigm: Detection mechanism.
Figure 4. RREP from Node C.
1.5 Black Hole Attack
A black hole attack7 is a type of denial-of-service attack in which a router that is supposed to relay packets
instead discards them. In Black hole attack, all network traffic are redirected to a specific node which does
not exist in reality. Because traffic disappear into the special node as the matter disappears into Black hole in
universe. Hence the specific node is named as a Black hole. Modification of the protocol leads to the control of
the traffic flow through a specific node. Black hole attack may be single black hole attack or a cooperative black
hole attack.8
A Black hole has following properties. Initially, the node has to advertise itself as having a valid route to a
destination node, even though the route does not exist, with the intention of intercepting packets by exploiting
the ad hoc routing protocol, such as AODV. Next, the node imbibes the intercepted packets.
Figure 5. Malicious node’s reply.
2. AODV: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION
The Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) is a routing protocol destined for ad hoc mobile networks.
AODV has both unicast as well as multicast routing. It is an on demand algorithm, which maintains these routes
as long as they are needed by the sources. AODV builds routes using a route request / route reply query cycle.
AODV has three types of control messages namely:
• Route Request (RREQ) Message
• Route Reply (RREP) Message
• Route Error (RERR) Message
2.1 Route Request (RREQ) Message
When the connection between source node and destination node has to be done and if it does not have destination
route entry, then a control packet; named Route Request message (RREQ); will broadcasted by the source node.




• Source Sequence No.
• Destination Address
• Destination Sequence No.
• Hop Count
2.2 Route Reply (RREP) Message
If a node has a valid route to the destination or is the destination, it unicasts a Route Reply message (RREP)
back to the source. RREP format includes:
• Source Address
• Request ID
• Source Sequence No.
• Destination Sequence No.
• Hop Count
2.3 Route Error Message (RERR)
The nodes performs monitoring of their own neighborhood. A Route Error message (RERR) is developed while
the route is invalid or broken, a Route Error message (RERR) is generated to notify the other nodes that use
this route, that the route becomes invalid. This message is generated to avoid retransmitting by that route. Two
Separate counters for Every Node:
• Sequence number.
• Broadcast-id (increments whenever the source issues a new RREQ).
The source requests using RREQ broadcasting:
• The last known number to the source is the Destination number of RREQ.
Source S sends RREQ to the neighbour node A to establish a route. Node A further broadcasts the RREQ from
A to all its neighbours namely S, B, C. The destination replies using RREP (Route Reply) unicasting:
• The sequence number is first incremented when it is equal to the number within the request.
• RREP contains the current sequence number, full lifetime, hoptime = 0.
Intermediate nodes:
• Discard duplicate requests.
• Replies are done when it has an active route with S.
• If there is no such way then it broadcasts the request on all interfaces.
• The node which has route to destination replies with the RREP message. Here, in the example node C
replies with the RREP message.
• Node performs recording the address of the neighbor who send RREQ.
Keep track of some information:
• Source IP address, Broadcast id, Expiration time for reverse path route entry, Source node’s sequence
number, Destination IP address.
• Setup forward path.
• Unicast RREP (Route reply) back to the reverse path.
• Each node on the trail sets up a forward pointer to the node from that the RREP came.
• Routing table entry is updated.
• Propagate the primary RREP or the RREP if contains a greater destination sequence number or the
identical sequence number with a smaller hop count then contained in RREQ.
• Nodes that are not on the trail in which the area determined by the RREP will be timed out and can
delete the reverse pointers.
Whenever a source node requires a route to a destination, it broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet
across the network where there is no route to that destination. All the nodes receiving this packet update their
information for the source node and tracks back to the source node in the routing tables. In addition to the
source node’s IP address, broadcast ID and current sequence number the RREQ also contains the most recent
sequence number for the destination, the source node is aware of. A node which receives the RREQ sends a route
reply (RREP) if it is either the destination or if it has a route to the destination with corresponding sequence
number greater than or equal to the one contained in the RREQ .In that case it unicasts a RREP back to the
source. Else, it rebroadcasts the RREQ. Nodes track the RREQ’s source IP address and broadcast ID. If already
processed RREQ is received, it is discarded and not forwarded further.
AODV deals with the route table management. The information in Route table must be kept even for short-
lived routes. The routing data in AODV is collected on request, the queries present in the network helps to
decide the route. The routing message has the information only about the source and the destination, not about
the whole route path. Hence routing message doesn’t not have increasing size. To show the freshness of the
route AODV uses source sequence Number (SSN) or Destination sequence Number (DSN).
3. BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN AODV
Any intermediate node having fresh route to the destination can reply to the Route Request (RREQ) sent by
the source node. Using this malicious node9 can send the RREP packet to the source node with the claim of
a promising route to the destination node. But in reality the malicious node does not have any route to the
destination node but just sends false information. Source node after receiving this, send the data through this
malicious node and this node drops the packets. Such nodes can crash the network. The malicious node in
this network is denoted by M .The malicious node10 falsely advertises to the source that it has route to the
destination. This is done to sending RREP message to the source on seeing the RREQ request from the source.
But in reality, the malicious node has no route to the destination. The source node sends data through the
advertised path of the malicious node. The packets are dropped by the malicious node without the knowledge
of the source node.
Black Hole is a major security threat, for the detection of malicious node which causes black hole11 and to
terminate the malicious node a new method is propose. To block and eliminate black hole attack the proposed
approach is combined with Ad hoc on demand routing protocol (AODV).12
4. APPROACHES TO BLACK HOLE ATTACK USING IDS
The black hole attack where a dishonest node does not forward messages to its successor. The black hole node
misbehaves to preserve its resources such as its limited energy or to launch a denial of service attack aimed at the
network availability. The various intrusion detection schemes13 against black hole attack are discussed below.
A novel routing security algorithm which is called Promiscuous Listening Routing Security Algorithm (PLRSA)14
is proposed in this paper. PLRSA does not add any overhead but only uses the characteristic of mobile ad hoc
networks to examine every passing through packets. It is so-called ”promiscuous listening”. Another advantage
of PLRSA is to easily implement the security functions in the existing ad hoc routing protocols. In addition,
PLRSA can also solve the packet modifying attack. The paper9 proposes a dynamic training method for anomaly
detection, in which regular updating of training data occurs. Various modules such as feature selection and dis-
crimination module of anomaly detection are included in the proposed technique. The average detection rate is
increased and the average false positive rate is decreased.
From this result, the detection rate and false positive rate has been improved. In the proposed method, by
updating the training data it can adapt to the changing environment in MANET, while using initial training
data only using only the initial training data cannot adapt to the dynamically changing environment.
The Proposed authenticated end-to-end acknowledgment based approach,5 which checks the correct forward-
ing of packets by intermediate nodes. This approach detects the black hole launched in simple or cooperative
manner. Compared to the 2-hop ACK and the watchdog approaches, proposed approach has the best delivery
ratio of packets and the highest detection ratio,15 but it generates a communication overhead slightly more
significant than that in the 2-hop ACK approach.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed various schemes for detection and removal of black hole attacks16 in MANET.
The various schemes suggest that the network parameters are affected greatly by the presence of the malicious
node. So detection and removal of them would improve the network performance. This paper also discusses
the diverse Intrusion Detection schemes for the detection of this black hole attack17 and easily removing them
thereby ensuring security for the network at the elementary level. The Future work will be a skilled detection and
exclusion algorithm with optimization technique for minimum delay and secured data packets under Black-Hole
attack.
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Table 1. Existing Schemes for Black-hole detection in MANET
Ref. No Scheme Routing Protocol Year Result
18 Acknowledgement based scheme OLSR 2008
The number of false alarms
reduces with the increasing
timeout value
19 Detection Prevention and
reactive AODV (DPRAODV)
AODV 2009
PDR of DPRAODV is improved
by 85% than AODV under
attack
20 REAct-Resource Accountability
based on Random Audits
DSR 2009
Communication overhead grows
upto three times larger





Route Discovery for AODV
(ERDA)
AODV 2012
When the number of malicious
node increases,AODV with
ERDA method provide
significant improvement in the
packet delivary
22 Watchdog Mechanism AODV 2012




attack prevention system in
clustered MANET
AODV 2012
PDR increases with decrease in
the number of malignant nodes.
The control overhead is also less
24
Detection of Black hole attack
in MANET under AODV
protocol
AODV 2013
PDR of the proposed AODV is
immune to the malicious nodes
whereas AODV is not. There is
very less packet loss percentile
in the proposed AODV
25 Detecting and overcoming Black
hole attack in AODV protocol
AODV 2013
The network parameters like
PDR, throughput are tested for
the honest network and
malicious one
26
Advanced AODV protocol for
the Detection and Elimination
of Black Hole Attack in
MANET’s
AODV 2015










maintains blacklist of such
nodes, finds multipath to
destination and decrease the
route discovery time
Table 2. Various intrusion detection systems for addressing black-hole attack
Ref. No Scheme Routing Protocol Year Result
28
SEAD: secure efficient distance
vector routing for mobile
wireless ad hoc networks
NS2 2003
The PDR increases in SEAD but
overhead also increases which is
disadvantage
14 Promiscuous Listening Routing
Algorithm (PLRSA)
NS2 2006
PLRSA uses only passive
observation to isolate the black
holes. DSR with PLRSA
provides better throughput
performance than DSR
9 Anomaly detection scheme
using dynamic training method
NS2 2007
The average detection rate is
increased by more than 8% and
the average false positive rate is
decreased by more than 6%




outperforms the Watch Dog,
with a minor cost in energy
consumption
29
Artificial Immune System based
on Type2 FUZZY Sets of
MANET IDS
None 2010
Partial anomaly based detection
technique is deployed. Active
Immune based response on
attacked system is used
30 Energy based trust solution
using fuzzy logic for IDS
NS2 2012
Anomaly based detection is used
to detect selfish nodes
21 Fuzzy logic based IDS NS2 2012
Misuse based detection
technique is used to detect black
hole attack and alarm response
mechanism is used
31
BeeID: Intrusion Detection in
AODV-based MANETs Using
Artificial Bee Colony Negative
Selection Algorithms
NS2 2012
BeeID increases the average
detection rate of DCAD and
WPCA and decreases the
average false-alarm rate of them
32 Sequential cross validation
procedure
GlomoSi-m 2013
Effective usage of weighted cost





PDR is better than two hop
approach and watch dog
approach
34
A Fortify Approach to Secure
AODV Protocol against Black
Hole Attacks
NS2 2015
The mechanism is integrated
into route decision making
process of the AODV protocol to
defend the black hole attack.
Thus PDR increases with the
proposed mechanism
35 Intrusion Detection scheme
based on hop count mechanism
NS2 2015
The PDR increases by the
proposed method and the data
drop increases if the count of
malicious node increases
36 Modified AODV protocol to
avoid Black hole attack
NS2 2015
When the number of nodes is
increased, the packet deliver
ratio and routing load of the
proposed IASAODV protocol is
better
